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ABSTRACT 
 
Corporate finance theory suggests that bank’s private information about 
borrowers lets them hold up borrowers for higher interest rates and that 
hold up power should increase with borrower risk, and if so, banks with 
private information about borrowers should increase their rates in 
recessions more than warranted by borrower risk alone.  Studies have 
been concluded in other markets for these propositions, particularly for 
the US market.  This paper has replicated these studies for an emerging 
economy (Republic of South Africa) to see if the findings will hold across 
dissimilar markets.  Hold up cost is not just a function of information 
monopoly, Rajan, 1992 posits that firms with a higher probability of 
failure should suffer more from informational hold-up cost.  The risk of 
failure is more pronounced during recession than in expansion and 
hence relationship banks with information monopolies are able to extract 
more rents in recession than warranted by borrower default risk alone.   
Using literature that suggest that information rents can be 
mitigated by multiple banking relationships, I investigated further, 
whether this problem of hold up cost can be mitigated through a different 
channel by studying credit spreads of firms that have publicly sourced 
funds, and continued to seek private funds in the South African 
market.Using LOANSPREAD as the dependent variable in a regression 
model, I find that loan spreads are higher for bank-dependent firms, rise 
in recessions and rise by a greater amount in recessions for bank-
dependent firms.  In the context of this study I define bank-dependent 
firms as those firms who have issued no public bond.  The key finding is 
that, indeed multiple banking relationships can reduce informational 
monopolies, but issuing public bonds can be another channel that South 
African firms can use to avoid being taken advantage of by financiers 
with information monopoly over competing financiers. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Public debt as a source of funds is steadily increasing in South Africa as 
compared to when public debt market commenced in the early 1980s.  
When comparing the number of public debt issued between 2001 and 
2006 (174) with public debt issued between 2007 and 2010 (899), it is 
evident that there is exponential growth.  However, despite this 
exponential growth, data obtained from BESA shows that of the top 166 
companies listed in the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) about 14% 
have issued a corporate bond (public debt), which is just a paltry 23 
firms in total.  This shows that public debt funding still has a long way to 
go amongst South African firms.  An explanation is given by Blackwell 
and Kidwell (1988), and Krishnaswami, Spindt, and Subramaniam 
(1999) that floating costs of public placements make public debt 
financing unattractive for firms with small needs for external finance.  
Initial public offerings also tend to suffer from underwriting costs 
causing firms to leave money on the table.  Both these propositions are 
yet to be proven for the South African market as an effort to explain why 
the corporate bond market has not fully blossomed yet. 
 
Having made the above diagnosis, one can conclude that as a form of 
external financing, both equity issuances and private borrowings from 
bank and non-bank lenders are still popular amongst South African 
firms (Ojah and Pillay, 2009).If finance theory is anything to go by in the 
South African debt market, then private lenders of funds have a high 
propensity to hold up for higher interest rates fromfirms that are 
dependent on them.  Corporate finance theory suggests that bank’s 
private information about borrowers lets them hold up borrowers for 
higher interest rates (Rajan, 1992; Houston and James, 1996).  Santos 
and Winton (2008) suggested that hold up power should increase with 
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borrower risk, and if so, banks with private information about borrowers 
should increase their rates in recessions more than warranted by 
borrower risk alone.  They concluded this finding for a developed 
economy (US).   
 
This paper willreplicate their study for an emerging economy, the 
Republic of South Africa, to see if their findings will hold across 
dissimilar markets.  Even though this is a test for the South African 
market, Itest the same hypothesis, adjusting for limitations where South 
African data does not permit.Ojah and Pillay (2009) in their study of the 
corporate debt structure in South Africa highlighted the absence of data 
richness as an obstacle to studying corporate debt structure in emerging 
markets in detail.  I test these hypotheses by comparing the pricing of 
loans for bank-dependent borrowers with the pricing of loans for 
borrowers with access to the bond market, controlling for relevant risk 
factors. 
 
Hold-up cost is not just a function of information monopoly; Rajan (1992 
posits that firms with a higher probability of failure should suffer more 
from informational hold-up problems.  The risk of failure is more 
pronounced during recession than in expansion and hence relationships 
banking slanted banks with information monopolies are able to extract 
more rents in recession than warranted by borrower default risk alone 
(Santos and Winton, 2008). 
 
Using literature that suggests information rents can be mitigated by 
multiple banking relationships, Schenone (2010), and combining it 
withother corporate finance theories, I investigate further, whether this 
problem of hold up-cost can be mitigated through a different channel-
access to public debt market as well.  Thus I study credit spreads of 
firms that have publicly sourced funds, and continued to seek private 
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funds.  South African firms tend to issue public debt in Rand, but then 
source private debt in other currencies in the syndicated loan market; 
with the US dollar the most used currency.  I therefore use loan spread 
over LIBOR to test the hypothesis as opposed to spread over JIBAR as 
the commonly used reference borrowing index in the South African 
market. 
 
In Ojah and Pillay(2009), one of their findings was that public debt-
issuing firms experience significant reduction in both overall and 
systematic risks, and incur lower cost of capital following issuance than 
non-public debt issuers.  I take this finding further by seeking evidence 
that public debt-receiving firms’ bank loans are priced at a reduced 
spread compared to non-public debt-receiving firms, and that this is 
even more evident during recession when risks spread widens more than 
normal borrower risk alone, and yet for public debt-receiving firms risk 
spread increases by less when adjusted for all embedded risks.  This 
study is a first attempt in the South African market to access whether or 
not banks do hold up their clients, using private information they access 
through monitoring to earn higher interest rates, particularlyif the client 
firms do not have access to the corporate bond market. 
 
Further, Santos and Winton (2008) found that during recession, banks 
raise their rates more for bank dependent borrowers than for those with 
access to public debt markets.  They concluded that to a larger extent 
this was as a result of informational hold-up effects rather than to 
greater risk of borrower firms that are bank dependent when compared 
to those with bond market access.  We cannot overlook though, the fact 
that firms with access to public debt market tend to be less risky than 
firms without such access and if that is true, bank dependent firms are 
likely to fail more in recession than in expansion, which would tend to 
hike their borrowing costs.  Faulkender and Petersen (2006) take this 
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intuition further by implying that firms with access to public debt 
financing have more or higher leverage over their counterparts without 
access to public debt finance.  The above expectations or relations can be 
stated in the following questions, as tested by Santos and Winton (2008) 
for the US market, a set of similarquestions I examine for the South 
African market. 
 
Questions: 
 
1. What empirical evidence do we have that spreads should be 
lower for firms with public debt market access than for firms 
that do not have such access? 
2. What empirical evidence do we have that loan spreads should 
be higher in recessions than in expansions? 
3. Is the increase in loan spreads during recessions lower for firms 
with public debt market access than for firms without such 
access? 
 
As an objective proximate to this study I examine whether there exists 
information monopolies in an African emerging economy, and if so, do 
firms with access to public debt markets benefit in reduced rents against 
them when private owners of capital price their loans ex post bond initial 
public offerings.  Secondly, if reduced rents exist, is the loan pricing 
similar when the economy goes through a recession than when it goes 
through an expansion.Given these objectives, the contribution of this 
study relates to the fact that there is little academic research done on 
data from emerging markets, particularly African emerging economies 
(Ojah and Pillay, 2009); therefore, this will be an addition to that 
literature.  Secondly, most literature concentrate on the reasons firms 
choose bank debt over public debt, or the mix of the two and how they 
affect firm’s capital structure, or whether it is cheaper for firms to source 
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funds through bank loans as opposed to issuing bonds publicly.  In this 
study we seek to add to the literature that says there maybe benefits that 
accrue to firms with regards to bank loans once they have issued bonds, 
without saying that it offsets the cost of issuing a bond.  We also suggest 
that if the corporate finance theory of insiders and outsiders (Rajan, 
1992) is true, then sourcing public funds can be a mitigating factor in 
reducing the cost of funds as a result of information rents.   
 
1.1 A Synopsis of the South African Public Debt Market 
A more detailed historical background of the South African bond market 
is given in Ojah and Pillay (2009).  In this paper I updated both Table 1A 
and Table 1B of their paper in order to capture the recent bond 
issuances given that their data end in 2006.  There may be a slight 
variation in the descriptive statistics even though our data source is the 
same.  I tend to lean more on issued and listed debt securities as 
opposed to just issued debt securities which may be private and not 
listed on the JSE.  Additional to this, I categorize the issuing entities 
differently from Ojah and Pillay (2006) in that I separate banks from 
other corporates because their role of financial intermediation would 
cloud the findings of my study; I also combine state owned enterprises 
with water authorities because they are also owned by Government; 
lastly, I introduce a new category of supranational issuers to capture 
entities such as the African Development Bank, World Bank etc., who 
have also recently started issuing and listing in the South African bond 
market. 
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Table 1:  Issuing entities listed on the JSE by nominal values as at 
2011 
  
Issuing Entity 
Nominal Value of issue 
 (in million rand) 
Nominal Value of 
Issue as a % of total Value 
Central Government 734,935,049,005 58.67% 
Banks 155,309,346,854 12.40% 
Other Corporates 173,943,804,477 13.89% 
Government Municipalities 13,292,170,000 1.06% 
Parastatals 171,975,582,177 13.73% 
Supranationals 3,200,000,000 0.26% 
Total 1,252,655,952,512 100.% 
Data source:  JSE / BESA (Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange) 
 
Table 1 show that Central Government still dominates the South African 
bond market with the size of issues or in nominal values by 59%, even 
though it is at a decreasing rate.  Corporate issues have increased on the 
other hand at the expense of Central Government; especially non-bank 
corporate issues have increased significantly between the periods 2001-
2011 as shown in Table 2.  In nominal values non-bank corporates 
account for 14% of total issues which when you add to the 12% for bank 
corporates it totals to 25%, showing a 3% increase overall for corporates 
since 2006.  It may seem small in nominal terms, but Table 2 shows that 
both bank and non-bank corporates now account for about 86% of the 
bonds issued and listed in the South African bond market, even though 
it may be years before that increase shows in nominal values because 
Central Government is always the biggest issuer (in terms of nominal 
value) in any domestic market. 
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Table 2:  Issuing entities listed on the JSE by number of bonds 
issued and listed as at 2011 
 
Issuing entity 
No. of 
debt 
issues 
No. of 
debt 
issues 
No. of 
debt 
issues 
No. of 
debt 
issues 
No. of 
debt 
issues 
No. of 
debt 
issues Total issues 
% total issues 
by issuing 
entity 
 1975-79 1980-90 1991-96 1997-00 2001-06  2007-11 1975 -2011 1975 -2011 
Banks 0 0 0 1 50 387 438 40.0% 
Other Corporates 0 0 0 1 48 457 506 46.2% 
Government 0 0 11 2 62 6 81 7.4% 
Municipalities 2 1 0 0 3 8 14 1.3% 
Parastatals 0 0 2 3 11 37 53 4.8% 
Supranationals 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 0.4% 
Total issues 
/period 2 1 13 7 174 899 1096 100% 
% of total 
issues by issue 
period 0.18% 0.09% 1.19% 0.64% 15.88% 82.03% 100% 
 
Data source:  JSE / BESA (Johannesburg Stock Exchange) 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 sets out 
the theoretical foundationof the study and provides empirical evidence of 
the three hypotheses to be tested.  Section 3 presents the data sources 
and methodology used in the study.  Section 4 presents our results.  
Section 5 concludes the study by highlighting the implications of the 
findings and issues for further research. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
Given that we are looking at bank loans pricing in the context of the 
South African bond market, it wasimportant that we provide at least a 
synopsis of the South African public debt markets.  To bring our 
literature into further context we also review literature relating to 
information monopolies, and banking relationships, to ascertain the role 
they play in pricing of bank loans.   We further investigate related papers 
- 8 - 
 
to see if loan pricing differs ex post and ex ante bond issuance, during 
economic crisis or across the business cycle. 
 
2.2 Informational Monopoly 
In a banking relationship, the corporate finance theory of information 
monopoly refers to when a bank acquires proprietary firm-specific 
information that is unavailable to non-lenders (Schenone, 2010)1.  As a 
result of these information asymmetries between relationship lending 
banks and non-relationship lending banks, the latter is faced with the 
adverse selection problem.  Consequently this leads to borrowers facing 
high switching costs from one lender to the other and leads to the 
incumbent lender gaining an opportunity to extract rents from 
informationally captured borrowers.   
 
Generally the assumption is that, once a firm has issued a bond publicly, 
then information about the firm becomes opened to all lenders in the 
market and hence the information asymmetries should disappear, 
resulting to financing costs decreasing were the firm to approach a 
lender other than the incumbent lender seeking loan financing soon after 
the bond initial public offering (IPO)2.  This point is strengthened by 
Rajan’s (1992) findings that the availability of the option to issue public 
debt to a firm limits the relationship bank’s monopolypower.  Schenone 
(2009) used the firm’s bond IPO as a landscape leveling event and found 
that there is wider information dissemination as a result and that soon 
thereafter the adverse selection problem facing outside lenders 
diminishes; this paper follows the same line of thought regarding 
information monopoly.  In another paper, Hale and Santos (2009) 
                                                 
1
 The notion that in relationship banking, a bank learns more about a borrower’s characteristics than do 
other banks is also found in Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992). 
2
 Hale and Santos (2009) focus more on credit worthiness of the firm at the IPO as revealed by its credit 
rating because a vast majority of firms get their first credit rating at the time of their bond IPO and because 
there is evidence that rating agencies produce valuable information on firms. 
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usesbanks’ pricing policies before and after borrowers gain access to 
public debt market to ascertain whether or not banks price their 
information monopoly and they find that firms are able to borrow at 
lower interest rates after their bond IPOs.3Equally of importance of Hale 
and Santos is that, they discovered that if a firm issues a bond for the 
first time after having received a credit rating a while back, the benefit 
that accrues in terms of less cost of funds is small compared to when the 
firm obtains its credit rating in the process of the bond IPO.  As already 
mentioned credit ratings and registration disclosure for an IPO (both 
equity and bond registration) produce valuable information which was 
otherwise material non-public information to investors. 
 
Hale and Santos (2009) also find that loan spreads after the bond IPO 
can decline for other reasons other than the disappearance of the 
incumbent banks’ information rents.  They argue that firms which gain 
access to public debt financing are likely to use it as a bargaining tool in 
their loan negotiations despite the differences that exists between these 
funding sources. 
 
2.3 Banking Relationships 
According to Santos and Winton (2008), there has been more 
concentration of literature on whether firms that depend on banks seek 
one or more bank relationships, arguing that reliance on a single bank 
implies that the benefits of a single bank outweigh the informational 
costs.4  Even though this paper takes a different tact in that it looks at 
how the pricing of bank loans varies across the business cycle for firms 
using “arm’s length” debt, it is still vital to look at how bank 
relationships influence the pricing of private loans.  Several papers have 
                                                 
3
 See also Santos and Winton (2008) and Schenone (2007) 
4
 Houston and James (1996) find that reliance on bank borrowing depends on firm size, the importance of 
growth opportunities and intangible assets, overall leverage, the number of bank relationships and the 
firms’ access to public debt markets. 
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looked at the relationship between borrowing rates and the intensity of 
the lending relationship, and the results are not conclusive.  Sharpe 
(1990) and Greenbaum, Kanatas, and Venezia (1989) argue that interest 
rates will increase as the banking relationship intensifies over the years;  
they posit that initially banks subsidize firms by charging rates below 
market spot-borrowing costs and then once they reach equilibrium they 
start raising the interest rates over the course of the relationship. 
Boot and Thakor (1994) argue that rates should decrease with 
relationship intensity, because borrowing firms face above market spot-
borrowing rates until they prove successful.  This point is further 
strengthened by Petersen and Rajan (1994) as well as Diamond (1991), 
who argue that the longer a firm has been servicing a loan creates trust 
from the bank believing that the firm has a viable business, and 
therefore using hindsight would reduce future cost of funds for this firm. 
Farinha and Santos (2002) try to explain why a firm may switch from 
single to multiple lending relationships, without necessarily assuming 
loan pricing to be the only determinant.  They suggest that concerns with 
hold-up costs, together with unwillingness by the incumbent bank to 
increase its exposure to a firm because of its past poor performance, are 
the key reasons for these firms to initiate an additional relationship.  
Another dimension they noted is that competition amongst banks may 
limit the incumbent bank from extracting rents without eliminating it, 
because the outside banks are afraid of the “winner’s curse”5.  Studies 
have also shown that there is direct evidence on the benefit of multiple 
lending relationships for younger firms and little for larger publicly 
                                                 
5
 Sharpe (1990) posits that due to competition, rents are competed away via lower interest rates on loans 
offered to all firms in their initial period, precisely when banks know the least about firms. 
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traded firms (Petersen and Rajan 1994)6; hence Houston and James 
(1996) conclude that reliance on bank borrowing depends on firms’ size7. 
 
Schenone (2009) posits that all else equal, borrowing rates decline with 
the intensity of a banking relationship (defined by loan concentration), 
either information asymmetries among lenders and non lenders are 
diminishing or relationship banks are strategically sharing the surplus 
granted by the relationship with the borrowing firm.We conclude this 
section with Fama’s findings that a bank which actually lends to a firm 
learns more about that borrower’s characteristics than do other banks 
(Fama, 1985). 
 
2.4 Loan Pricing ex ante and ex post Bond Issuance 
In this paper we do not look at whether the costs that are borne by firms 
as a result of raising funds through public markets are higher or lower 
than if firms sourced funds through private means.  We want to see if 
there are benefits that accrue to these firms following their bond IPOs.  
Hale and Santos (2009), tackle both questions but the results of the 
latter hypotheses are that there are benefits that accrue to firms’ ex-post 
bond IPOs; firms benefit from both a reduction in the interest rates they 
pay on bank loans and the costs they incur to issue private bonds after 
they enter the public bond market.  This derives from the information 
firms need to release to enter the public debt market, which is likely to 
reduce banks’ informational advantage and consequently decrease their 
ability to extract rents from firms, (Hale and Santos, 2009)8.Further 
studies on equity IPOs show the same results as bond IPOs, and 
suggestthat these events are seen as new information releasing events 
                                                 
6
 They also find that borrowing costs are unrelated to the length of the lending relationship suggesting 
banks extract their rents from informationally captured borrowers instead. 
7
 But also find that establishing multiple relationships may be one way to mitigate hold-up problems and 
that firms are less likely to suffer hold-up problems if they have access to public debt markets. 
8
 See Rajan (1992) and Sharpe (1990) 
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about the firms coming into the debt and equity markets for the first 
time9. 
 
2.5 Economic Crisis and Loan Pricing 
Spiegel (2011) indicates that when the 2008 financial crisis hit the 
financial markets, not only did it freeze the funding market but also it 
affected non-financial firms.  Analyzing other research papers, he draws 
a conclusion that as a result of the crisis capital became costly to non 
financial firms, and if funding was eventually granted to them, they also 
received less than they wanted to access beyond the fact that accessing 
funds became harder during the crisis.  Adrian, Colla, and Shin (2011), 
in their working paper confirms what Spiegel et al posits by identifying a 
negative relationship between loans and bonds during economic crisis; 
they find that whilst loans to firms decrease during recession, there is a 
corresponding increase in corporate bond issuance that compensates the 
created gap.If this is explained from a credit squeeze point of view, it will 
concur with Bernanke (1983), that ballooning spreads during recession 
are caused by dwindling credit demand from investors as the real cost of 
intermediation increased. Campello (2011) shows that as a result of the 
increase in the cost of funds during economic crisis, firms with good 
internal cash flows switched to those funds instead of digging into their 
credit lines.  
 
Other studies like Bernanke (1983) tried to find a correlation between 
bank lending and aggregate measures of economic activity to explain the 
contraction of lending during crisis times.  Bernanke (1983) posits that it 
is not inconsistent to argue that the collapse in the financial system has 
effects on the macro economy other than through monetary channels.  
Santos (2011), unlike most studies that focus on bank lending volume, 
                                                 
9
 See Schenone (2005) on equity IPOs 
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focuses on bank loan pricing during and after economic crisis.  He finds 
that loan spread rose during the subprime crisis, but larger for those 
banks that incurred massive losses.  He also finds that these banks with 
larger losses increased the loan spreads more for bank dependent 
borrowers than arm’s length debt borrowers.  The credit spread widening 
seem to be bank driven, but whether bank driven or not the evidence 
from the analysis is that the incumbent bank is able to extract rents 
more for bank dependent borrowers than for public debt market 
borrowers even during a crisis. 
 
2.6 Evidence on the Cost of Bond Issuance over the Business 
Cycle 
Santos (2006) presents a theory that the relative cost of bond financing is 
partly due to credit rating firms or agencies that firms use to raise bond 
financing.  He further argues that because of information frictions, these 
agencies are unable to rate firms correctly thus resulting in the cost of 
bond financing being dependent on the state of the economy and the 
quality signal provided by these agencies.  In this paper I use this theory 
to examine whether indeed in recession the cost of bond financing is 
higher than in expansion and hence varies across the business cycle.  
Preliminary answer to this question is evidenced by Santos (2006) finding 
that in the US bond market bond credit spreads widen in recession in 
the primary market, affecting the relative cost of bond financing across 
issuers of different credit worthiness, phenomena I assume would be the 
same across other markets10.  It is also worth noting that because of 
these agencies providing the much needed signals about the firms, the 
asymmetries in information may soon disappear.   
 
                                                 
10
 Santos (2006) find that recession increases the cost of bond financing for mid quality firms, but recession 
may also increase the cost of bond financing to all firms, in which case mid-quality firms are suspected 
affected the most. 
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In a different theory Bernanke (1983) argues that the disruption of the 
financial sector by the banking and debt crisis raised the real cost of 
intermediation between lenders and certain classes of borrowers.  He 
posits that, for a given safe rate, an increase in the cost of credit 
intermediation reduces the total quantity of goods and services currently 
demanded.  Using yield differential between Baa corporate bonds and the 
U.S. government bonds between 1921 and 1933 as a proxy for the cost of 
credit intermediation, Bernanke et al shows that spread steadily rose 
from 2.31% to a high of about 7.93% during this period. 
 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
3.1 Data 
Dataused in this research paper come from several data sources, namely:  
Deal Logic (a collective database for all Investment Banks deals in South 
Africa), BESA / JSE, Bloomberg, and McGregor-BFA.  I use data from 
BESA / JSE to identify firms that have issued or sourced funds from the 
public debt market.  This data also gave me the credit rating, nominal 
amount, issue date, type of bond, coupon rate, and other relevant 
information pertinent to the issuance of bonds in the public debt market.  
To identify those firms which borrowed from banks and when they did so 
I use both Bloomberg and Deal Logic.   
 
The Bloomberg data only identifies firms that have borrowed from banks 
without indicating the corresponding pricing.  On the other hand, the 
Deal Logic data provides both the loan signing dates and the 
corresponding pricing.  We note however that, firstly, this database 
contains syndicated loans, and secondly that the database is poorly 
administered as sometimes critical information such as pricing is 
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missing.  We omit such entries even though that reduces the sample 
size.  On the syndicated loans, the Lead Arranger structures the terms of 
the deal and take such responsibilities as monitoring the borrower on 
behalf of the syndicate members, making such loans synonymous, in a 
way, to individual loans issued by a bank to a specific borrower firm, Sufi 
(2007). 
 
To identify those firms which borrowed from banks prior to borrowing 
from the public debt market, I match data sources from BESA using the 
Bond Initial Public Offering date with data from Deal Logic using the loan 
signing date.The period from 2000 to 2010 saw an increase in corporate 
bond issuances, particularly by non-banks corporates, so I use it as my 
sample period.  Although there was an increase in the number of 
issuances, the data indicates that of the 166 firms in the All Africa JSE 
Share Index, only 14% issued bonds publicly, an indication that the 
increase in issuance is concentrated amongst 23 firms.  This significantly 
reduces the sample size considering that these 23 firmsare inclusive of 
bank corporates. 
 
The banks’ loan data will give me information on bilateral loans taken by 
firms from banks, including loan’s spread over LIBOR, maturity, 
seniority status, purpose and type; the borrower, including its sector of 
activity and its legal status (public or private firms); and lastly, the 
lending syndicate, including the identity and role of the banks in the loan 
syndicate.  To ascertain firm-specific and loan specific variables that 
might be expected to affect loan credit risk, I used McGregor-BFA as my 
main data source. 
 
For definition of recession, I used the South African Reserve Bank 
Composite Business Cycle Indicator (SACBLI Index).  The SACBLI Index 
uses the same compilation methodology as the Conference Board in the 
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United States according to Venter and Pretorius (2004).  The Index 
defines the business cycle as either a downward phase or an upward 
phase.   
Graph 1:  Composite Leading Business Cycle Indicator from 1990 to 
2008 
 
Source:  SARB 
 
According to Venter (2009), the composite leading business cycle 
indicator reached a lower turning point in October 1998.  See table 3. 
 
Table 3:  Breakdown of up and down phases of South Africa’s 
Business Cycle for 1993-2009 
 
Upward Phase Duration  
(Months) 
 Downward Phase Duration 
(Months) 
June 1993 – November 
1996 
42  December 1996 – August 
1999 
33 
September 1999 – 
November 2007 
99  December 2007- August 
2009 
21 
Source:  SARB 
 
According to Graph 1, the leading indicator then increased 
significantly before reaching a peak in February 2000, where after it 
followed a moderate downward trend up to September 2001.  After 
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another steep increase, the indicator again reached a peak in April 
2002, decreasing abruptly until May 2003.  From 1996 to 2011, there 
are two distinct recessions in 1998 and 2008 and one expansion from 
2002 to 2007, with a combination of moderation and a downward 
swing for the period of 1999 and 2001 and again in 2007. 
 
Graph 2:  Composite Leading Business Cycle Indicator from 1990 to 
2011
 
Source:  SARB 
 
The limitation of this study is scarcity of data that spans a period of 
about fifteen to twenty years so that I am able to capture several up 
and down swings in the business cycle.  However, as shown in graph 
1 and 2 above the period from 1998 to 2011 had two recessions and 
one prolonged expansion which is sufficient to address questions 2 
and 3.  This data problem will also be compounded by the fact that 
the South African bond market was still in its infancy for much of the 
period between 1980 and 1992 and the corporate bond market’s first 
issue was only in 1992.  As in Ojah and Pillay (2009), in 2009 the 
corporate bond market accounted for only 22% of the nominal value 
issued on the BESA inclusive of financial firms.  For this study I 
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needed to exclude banking financial firms for stronger results, but I 
will include them because of the smallness of my sample size. 
 
Poor data entry into Deal Logic reduced the syndicate loan sample 
size from about 340 loans to about 65 loans, with missing pricing 
information the main reason for dropping loan entries.  Of the 65 
remaining loans in the sample, 57 are Dollar loans priced at 3 months 
LIBOR plus / or minus a spread which Bernanke (1983) refers to it as 
the cost of credit intermediation (CCI) and the other 8 loans are Euro 
loans priced at 3 months EURIBOR plus / or minus a spread.  To 
standardize the sample I used the SWAP functionality in Bloomberg to 
convert the Euro loans into Dollar loans and the EURIBOR spread 
into LIBOR spread with matching maturities and interest payment 
frequencies. 
 
However, I have decided to include banks in the sample against my 
initial reasoning that because of the intermediation function that 
banks perform they may make the results a bit fuzzy.  LIBOR is 
however in a sense a measure of the cost of funds for banks in the 
interbank market and it is correctly reflective of the cost of funds for 
banks as it is for other firms seeking funds from banks.  Another 
factor I discovered is that almost all the South African firms borrow 
using dollar LIBOR as opposed to JIBAR (ZAR), making South Africa 
banks to be the same as any other firm in the LIBOR market. 
 
3.2 Methodology 
In order to test hypotheses inherent in question 1 through 3, as in 
Santos and Winton (2008), I investigate loan spreads and determine the 
impact of borrower access to public debt markets and of recessions, 
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controlling for various firm and loan-specific characteristics.  I estimate 
the following model on loan credit spreads: 
LOANSPREADf, l, t = c + δ. PUBDEBT ACCESS f, t + ζ . RECt 
         L 
   + η . RECt  . PUBDEBT ACCESSf, t + ∑ ψi X i, f, t 
         i=1 
   F 
      + ∑vjYj, l, t + εf, t.      (1) 
            j=1        
        
 
 
Where: 
 
LOANSPREADf, l, t  is the spread over LIBOR of loan l of firm f  
 taken at date t 
  
 PUBDEBT ACCESS f, t is a dummy variable that takes the value  
     of one if firm fhas access to public debt  
     markets as of the date of the loan 
 
 RECt    is a dummy variable that takes the value 
of one if there was a recession at this date 
 
X i, f, t  represents firms-specific variables  
  
 vjYj, l, t   represents various loan-specific variables  
     that might be expected to affect loan credit  
     risk 
 
 εf, t.    is the error term of the estimation  
equation 
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As in Santos and Winton (2008), all three hypotheses are incorporated in 
the equation above.  In hypotheses 1, a negative δ indicates that firms 
with public market access pay lower spreads; for hypotheses 2, a positive 
ζ indicates an increase in spreads during recession; and for hypotheses 
3, a negative η indicates that in recession spreads increase less for firms 
with public market access than for bank-dependent firms. 
We have a few concerns with the methodology as in Santos and Winton 
(2008); firstly, on the recession dummy, even if we find the coefficient 
positive, that would not necessarily indicate that the increase in spreads 
during recession is excess hold-up costs, but rather a premium for 
additional risk.  Secondly, credit spreads reflect firm specific risks and it 
is possible that risk for firms with public debt access is different from 
firms without such access.  These were taken care of by using proxies 
that control for different aspects of credit risks.  Even though, we were 
not able to do difference for difference tests as in Santos and Winton 
(2008), we allude to the result of their study which found that there are 
no significant observable risks between these two types of firms. 
 
3.3 Sample Characterization 
As already outlined in the data section, I use data from Deal Logic and 
BESA as the main data sources.  Deal Logic data constitutes firms listed 
at the JSE and firms that are not listed, and firms that have borrowed 
from both the public debt market and the private debt market.  The data 
also has those firms who have only borrowed from private sources of 
funds and are not listed at the JSE.  For the purposes of this study, I 
have used data from BESA to eliminate all data entries from Deal Logic 
for firms that are not listed or do not have access to the public debt 
markets.  I want to capture firms that have issued public debt and went 
on to borrow privately and also firms that have not issued public debt, 
- 21 - 
 
but have sourced private debt yet they are listed and have access to 
public debt.  This will enable me to see if there are any benefits that will 
accrue for the latter in terms of reduction in rents. 
 
Table 4 presents the definitions of the variables I use in this study.  
Graph 4 shows the numbers of loans to bank-dependent firms and to 
firms with access to the bond market over time.  Santos and Winton 
(2008) claims that bank-dependent borrowers seem to be more sensitive 
to credit conditions, and tend to show a high volatility in recession times.  
In Graph 4 I represent the classification of firms according to whether 
they are bank-dependent or not.  I classify firms as bank-dependent 
(MRPBOND=1)ifthe bond IPO is before the 31stof December 2011.  This 
will not take into consideration firms that have issued private bonds as 
the BESA data eliminates all private firms and private bonds issued by 
public firms. In Graph 4, my results may not be very conclusive and 
strong, but I note that in the two captured recessions in 2002 (which was 
a mini recession) and 2008 loans accessed by bank-dependent firms 
decreased; the other recession in 1998 has been excluded because it 
does not fall within the sample period which is 2000 to 2011.  I say my 
result may not be strong because, I note that a number of bank-
dependent firms are not publicly listed and therefore are not part of my 
sample, hence a selection bias.  However I do glean that those bank-
dependent firms included and defined above (MRPBOND=1) may to some  
extent, be sensitive to credit conditions. 
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Table 4: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
LOANSPREAD 
AGE 
OLDERFIRMS 
SALES 
SALES GROWTH 
TANGIBLES 
PROFITMARGIN 
INTCOVERAGE 
 
 
NWDEBT 
 
 
LEVERAGE 
CORPURPOSES 
 
REFINANCE 
TAKEOVER 
WORKCAPITAL 
 
LENDERS 
MATURITY 
BOND 
 
PBOND 
 
PBONDblg 
 
PBONDnrt 
 
MRPBOND 
 
MRPBONDblg 
 
MRPBONDnrt 
 
REC 
 
 
JSE 
TSPREAD 
 
JSE 
 
 
Loan spread over LIBOR at the time of the loan origination. 
Age in years. 
Dummy variable equal to one for firms older than 20 years 
Sales in hundreds of millions of dollars. 
The firm’s sales growth in the year prior to the loan. 
Property, plant, and equipment plus inventories over assets 
Net income over sales. 
Earnings before taxes and depreciation over interest expenses.  
When the firm has no interest expenses this variable is set equal 
to earnings. 
Current assets minus current liabilities over total debt.  When the 
firm has no debt, this variable is set equal to current assets 
minus current liabilities. 
Total debt over assets. 
Dummy variable equal to one when loan is for corporate 
purposes. 
Dummy variable equal to one when loan is to repay existing debt. 
Dummy variable equal to one when loan is for takeover purposes. 
Dummy variable equal to one when loan is for working capital 
purposes. 
Number of lenders in the loan syndicate. 
Maturity of loan in years. 
Dummy variable equal to one for firms that issued bonds prior to 
their loan. 
Dummy variable equal to one for firms that issued public bonds 
prior to the loan. 
Dummy variable equal to one for those firms with PBOND=1 
whose last public bond prior to the loan was rate below grade. 
Dummy variable equal to one for those firms with PBOND=1 
whose last public bond prior to the loan was not rated. 
Dummy variable equal to one for firms whose most recent bond 
prior to the loan was public. 
Dummy variable equal to one for firms whose most recent bond 
prior to the loan was a public bond with a below grade rating. 
Dummy variable equal to one for firms whose most recent bond 
prior to the loan was a public bond not rated. 
Dummy variable equal to one for loans borrowed during a 
recession as defined by the South African Reserve Bank 
Composite Business Cycle Indicator (SACBLI Index. 
Dummy variable equal to one for firms that trade in the JSE 
Treasury yield curve slope computed as the difference between the 
30-and 5-year Treasury bonds. 
Dummy variable equal to one for firms that trade in the JSE 
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In Graph 3, I capture the relationship between the SARB repo rate and 
the spread differential between the 30-year and 5-year Government 
bonds; the horizontal shaded area is the periods during which the 
economy went into recession as defined by the SARB’s SACBLI Index.  
The best variables that one could have used in this instance as a 
determinant of the trend of credit spread across the business cycle would 
have been the Baa corporate bond and the Government bond of similar 
maturity as in Santos and Winton (2008) and Bernanke (1983).  
However, in the South African debt market there is no corporate yield 
curve yet and whatever data one got was too disjointed to be meaningful.   
 
Where the red line is flat there was no data for that period, either for the 
5-year bond or 30-year bond.  The graph shows that, during a recession, 
the spread of the 5-year Government bond was higher than the 30-year 
Government bond creating a negative variance.  Also, during recession 
the repo rate was at its peak as the spread differential bottomed, 
reflecting higher interest on the short end of the yield curve than the 
longer end.  Using, the two studies mentioned above, one can infer that 
credit spreads widen during recession more than in expansion. 
 
Table 5:  Average Loan spread of all Firms across the Business Cycle 
Average Loan Spread (all firms) in basis points 
 
Recessionary Period 248.796 
Non-Recessionary period 79.016 
 
Table 5 above helps to further strengthen the point made above and 
graphically in Graph 3 below, that indeed average loan spreads in 
general do widen more in recession than during expansion periods. 
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Graph 3:  SARB Repo Rate and 30-Year vs. 5-Year Yield Spread 
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Graph 4:  Time distribution of loans of bank-dependent and non-
bank dependent firms. 
 
Borrowers are defined as non-bank dependent if their bond IPO was before 
31st December 2011; otherwise they are defined as bank-dependent.  See 
Table 4 for variable definition. 
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Table 6:  Sample Characteristics 
 
 
 
Variables 
Firms 
 
Non Bank 
Dependent 
 
 
Bank 
Dependent 
 
 
Difference 
Average Loan Spread (basis points) 101.333 141.545 40.212 
Weighted Average Loan Spread 
(basis points) 
 
119.990 
 
171.185 
 
51.195 
    
Average Loan Spread:    
              Recession 239.860 266.667 26.807 
              No Recession 67.797 112.671 44.873 
    
Age (years) 42 37 -5 
Loan Amount ($m) 554.39 619.48 65 
Maturity (years) 2.980 3.323 0.344 
    
    
Profit Margin 9.62% 8.63% -0.99% 
Interest Cover 4.14 11.75 7.601 
Leverage 20.77% 48.40% 27.63% 
Tangibles 19.51% 20.27% 0.76% 
Net Working Capital -2.40 0.58 2.986 
StockVolatility 2.218% 2.533% 0.315% 
    
    
Purpose of Borrowing 
(percentage of total loan amounts) 
   
Corporate Purposes 31% 8%  
Refinancing 39% 64%  
Acquisition 30% 28%  
    
    
Number of Companies in Sample 46 16  
Percentage of Total Sample 74.2% 25.8%  
Percentage of companies with a    
below grade (or no) rating 24% 81%  
 
 
Table 6 above classify firms as non-bank dependent  if the firms has 
issued a public bond on or before 31st December 2011, which is the last 
date of including firms into the sample, and as bank-dependent 
otherwise.  We can see from the table that bank-dependent firms pay a 
higher spread when sourcing private debt or loans compared with their 
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non-bank dependent counterparts.  The difference is 40 basis points, 
whilst when the loan spread is weighted against the loan amount the 
difference increases to 51 basis points.  This is also an indication that 
bank-dependent firms in the South African market generally take higher 
loan amounts than non-bank dependent firms.  This could be explained 
in one reason, that even though bank-dependent firms tend to pay a 
higher spread on private loans they do not have an alternative source of 
funds because they can not issue debt publicly.  However because the 
sample only includes public firms who are eligible to issue public debt, I 
can infer without empirical proof that South African firms may tend to 
prefer private debt over public debt, maybe because of the costs 
associated with raising funds in the public debt domain.  Such costs as 
floatation costs and underwriting costs maybe higher than the loan 
spread these firms pay on private debt and this can further exacerbate 
the problem of hold-up costs. 
 
Another related factor under the loan specific controls is the maturity of 
the loans taken by either of these two categories of firms; bank-
dependent firms tend to take shorter term maturity loans than non-bank 
dependent.  However, my sample is largely constituted by short to 
medium term maturity loans, but it is still clear that on average the 
bank-dependent firms take loans in the region of 3.2 years compared to 
2.9 years for the non-bank dependent firms.  This is in agreement with 
the literature I reviewed, but what is a departure from other studies is 
the size of the loans, where most literature tends to say those bank-
dependent firms are more likely to take longer maturity loans in small 
amounts. 
My firm controls also indicate that bank dependent firms are younger, 
smaller and have fewer intangible assets.  The average age of bank-
dependent firms is 37 years compared to 42 years for the non-bank 
dependent firms.  I need to point out that my sample is however skewed 
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towards older firms, even though my results are consistent with the 
findings of Santos and Winton (2008).  This sample is constituted of the 
top 166 firms listed in the JSE; however of the 62 observations finally 
used as a sample, about 70% is in the top 40 of the JSE by market 
capitalization and Top 40 firms tend to be older in age. 
The stock prices of bank-dependent firms are on average more volatile 
and have high interest coverage.  What I found to be inconsistent with 
other studies like Faulkender and Petersen (2005) and Santos and 
Winton (2008) was that these firms were more levered than the non-bank 
dependent firms; but it is true that bank dependent firms have a high 
stock volatility.  Again all of these controls may have been smoothened 
by the average age of the entire sample which as already explained is 
skewed towards older firms. 
Other studies show that bank-dependent firms may have less syndicate 
members than non-bank dependent firms or the loan maybe extended by 
a single lender; for this study I decided to omit this control because this 
sample is wholly syndicated loans and there are no bilateral loans 
included. 
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4. RESULTS 
4.1 Univariate Analysis of Loan Spreads 
 
Table 7:  Loan Spreads at Issue Date for Bank-Dependent and Non-
Bank Dependent Borrowers Based on Equation 1. 
The dependent variable is LOANSPREAD and the models use ordinary least squares 
regression to estimate the values of the coefficients.  The terms in brackets below the 
coefficients represent the associated p-values of the estimates.  See table 4 for variable 
definitions. 
 
 
In the univariate analysis, the models examine the impact of bank 
dependence and recessions on loan spread.Bank dependence is gauged 
by whether or not the firm has access to raise funds in the public bond 
market, thus a firm with a public bond issuance is deemed to be non-
bank dependent.   
 
 
Variables 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
 
6 
CONSTANT 
 
141.545 
(0.00) 
107.1288 
(0.00) 
79.015 
(0.00) 
118.69 
(0.000) 
112.67 
(0.00) 
91.68 
(0.00) 
BOND 
 
-61.906 
(0.0187) 
  -52.90 
(0.0237) 
-44.87 
(0.0773) 
 
PBOND 
 
 -25.342 
(0.2899) 
   -31.38 
(0.1638) 
REC 
 
  128.484 
(0.0001) 
121.871 
(0.0001) 
153.995 
(0.0031) 
174.977 
(0.0005) 
REC*BOND 
 
    -49.79 
(0.426) 
 
REC*PBOND 
 
     -63.28 
(0.3089) 
Adjusted R2 0.076 0.002 0.22 0.275 0.270 0.254 
# Observations 60 60 60 60 60 60 
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In Model 1, LOANSPREAD is regressed against a constant and the 
dummy variable BOND.The results show that firms that have issued a 
public bond within the sample period typically pay 62 basis points less 
than those that have never issued the bond.This model testshypothesis 
1:  controlling for other firm and loan characteristics, loan spreads should 
be lower for firms with public bond market access than for firms that do 
not have such access.These estimates are highly significant at a 95% 
confidence level, as p-values are less than 0.05.In Model 2, 
LOANSPREAD is regressed against a constant and dummy variable 
PBOND (where PBOND is equal to 1 if the firm had issued a public bond 
prior to the loan date). The results show that a firm that has issued a 
public bond before taking out a loan would typically pay 25 basis points 
less than other firms.The result does not pass the significance test, and 
therefore needs to be interpreted cautiously;this suggests that there is no 
sufficient evidence to accept the null hypothesis although the sign of the 
coefficient conforms to expectations.  The tested sample constitutes only 
public firms and public bonds if a firm issued one, as such Model 1 and 
2 will typically give the same results. 
In Model 3, LOANSPREAD is regressed against a constant and dummy 
variable REC (recession).The result shows that during recessions, 
spreads are typically 128 basis points higher than in non-recessionary 
periods. The results are highly significant.  This model testshypothesis 2:  
controlling for other firm and loan characteristics, loan spreads should be 
higher in recessions than in expansions. 
In Model 4,the variables, BOND and REC are tested together as 
explanatory variables of LOANSPREAD. The results obtained are 
consistent with those estimated in the univariate analysis in models 1 
and 3.They show that firms that have issued a bond will typically pay 53 
basis points lower than other firms and during a recession spreads will 
be 122 basis points higher than in expansionary periods.The coefficient 
estimates are highly statistically significant.   
Model 5 is an extension of Model 4, with the inclusion of the variable 
REC*BOND, which captures the interaction between the recession and 
bank dependency dummies.The results show that for firms that have 
issued a bond, the spread is typically 45 basis points lower than other 
firms (lower than estimate of 62 basis points estimated in Model 1).In 
periods of recession, spreads will be 154 basis points higher. The 
negative coefficient of REC*BOND is as per expectation, and signifies that 
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firms which have issued a public bond will pay lower spreads in a 
recession than those firms which have never issued a public 
bond.Therefore, firms with a public bond will effectively pay a spread of 
104 basis points in a recession (this is given by 153.995 less 49.79) 
whereas other firms will typically face a spread of 154 basis points.The 
large p-value of the coefficient of REC*BOND indicates it is not 
statistically significant even though the direction of the sign of the 
REC*BOND is correct.This model tests hypothesis 3:  controlling for other 
firm and loan characteristics, the increase in loan spreads during 
recession should be lower for firms with public bond market access than 
for firms without such access.  Model 6 is similar to Model 5, but uses the 
variable PBOND as a measure for bank dependency.The estimates of the 
coefficients are in line with expectations, as PBOND and PBOND*REC 
both have negative coefficients and the REC variable has a positive 
coefficient.However, the high p-values of the coefficient estimates indicate 
that two of the variables are not statistically significant.  
I need to point out that even though these results are consistent with the 
findings of Santos and Winton (2008) for the US market, once I 
introduced controls for firm and loan specific risk the results become 
distorted and not significant as you would expect.  I therefore exclude the 
multivariate analysis of loan spread in my final result.  Koop, G (2006) 
reasonably argues that having more data points improves accuracy of 
estimation just as having a larger spread of values of the explanatory 
variable, X, improves the same.  My data may have a large pool of values 
of the explanatory variable but it lacks in having more data points.  I 
assume this is responsible for the observed distortion when I extend the 
estimation to include firm and loan specific risk controls.In summary, 
the results are consistent with my expectations on the impact of bank 
information monopolies on loan pricing across the business cycle. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
I investigate if, as in the US market, firms that have issued a public bond 
and have then sourced private funds benefit from reduced rents on those 
private funds in terms of favourable loan rates.  My investigation is 
extended to phases of the business cycle to see if my proposition holds 
the same in recessions versus expansions, with a view of finding a new 
channel through which firms can mitigate hold-up costs that come as a 
result of information monopolies of banks.  Do I find the same results as 
Santos and Winton (2008) for the US market, that banks hold up for 
higher interest rates from firms without access to the public bond market 
and that this is more pronounced during recessions than in expansion? 
The evidence is at least not inconsistent with this proposition.  My 
results hold when a univariate analysis on LOANSPREAD is performed.  I 
find that loan spreads are higher for bank-dependent firms, rise in 
recession and rise by a greater amount in recessions for bank dependent 
firms. 
 
From the univariate analysis performed there is clear evidence that firms 
with access to the South African public bond market pay a spread that is 
62 basis points less than those firms without access to the public bond 
market.  I believe that if the data also included non-public firms and 
bilateral loans this spread would be wider than the reported 62 basis 
points.  In my introduction, this hypothesisfalls under question 1 and 
the results are given by model 1 in the univariate analysis.  Model 2 also 
shows that a firms that has issued a public bond before taking a loan 
pays a spread of 25 basis points less than other firms and for both 
models these results are significant at 95% with p-values less than 0.05. 
 
Again from the univariate analysis we have evidence that in the South 
African market credit spreads move higher the most in recessions than in 
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expansions.  In recessions spreads are higher by 128 basis points than 
in expansions.  Model 3 was a test to answer question 2.  A combination 
of Model 1 and 3 in Model 4 interacts, the variables BOND and REC 
against LOANSPREAD with the same results as the latter two models.  
For the last hypothesis I test if the increase in loan spreads during 
recessions is lower for firms with public debt market access than for 
firms without such access, the results are in the affirmative.  Firms with 
public bond market access pay 104 basis points in recessions compared 
to 154 basis points for firms without access to public funds. 
 
Finally, I answer the question posed in the introduction, whether hold-up 
costs can be mitigated through other channels apart from multiple 
banking relationships.  The conclusion is that by issuing public bonds 
South African firms can reduce their cost of borrowing significantly in 
the private debt market. 
I did not attempt to answer the question whether issuing a public bond 
is cheaper than sourcing funds in the South African private debt market.  
This is an avenue for further study.  This in particular, can help explain 
why listed South African firms still prefer bank loans over public bond 
financing (an insight gained from some of the data I analyzed); and also 
equity issuances than public debt (bonds) as seen in the synopsis of the 
South African bond market.  
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